Game Analysis in the Sharing Process of Enterprise-type Customer Knowledge

Enterprise-type customer knowledge crucially influences the development of the enterprise, but the sharing process and the sharing conditions of it is diverse due to the difference of the position of enterprise-type customer in the supply chain. Hence, this paper respectively adopts the dynamic game of complete information and that of incomplete information to analyze the sharing process of different enterprise-type customer knowledge. Moreover, the backward induction of dynamic programming is used to solve the sub-game perfect equilibrium so that the sharing conditions of enterprise-type customer knowledge are obtained. The research results show that it mainly depends on the prior probability that customer knowledge is valuable and the charge for sharing knowledge whether the enterprise-type customer as the final consumer share its knowledge with the enterprise; on the other hand, the relationship among the cost of self-study, the cost of knowledge sharing and distribution proportion of income becomes the crucial factor affecting the knowledge sharing between the enterprise-type customer who is not the final consumer and the enterprise.