Can We Reduce Deception in Elite Field Experiments? Evidence from a Field Experiment with State Legislative Offices

被引:13
|
作者
Landgrave, Michelangelo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Riverside, 900 Univ Ave, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
关键词
field experiment; experimental methods; methodology; discrimination; representation; Hispanic; Latino politics; identity; group politics; research ethics; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; DICTATOR GAME; ETHNICITY; PREJUDICE; FAIRNESS; LOVE; RACE;
D O I
10.1177/1532440020925723
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The use of deception is common in elite correspondence audit studies. Elite audit studies are a type of field experiment used by researchers to test for discrimination against vulnerable populations seeking to access government resources. These studies have provided invaluable insights, but they have done so at the cost of using deception. They have relied on identity, activity, and motivation deception. In addition, they request unnecessary work. Is there a less deceptive alternative? In this article, I present results from a field experiment with state legislative offices that minimize the use of deception. Consistent with elite correspondence audit studies, I find evidence of discrimination against Hispanics among state legislative offices. In addition, I find that discrimination is mitigated when subjects believe their behavior will be public knowledge. This suggests that discrimination can be mitigated through increased monitoring. This article advances the discussion on how to minimize the use of deception in elite field experimentation and how to mitigate discrimination against vulnerable populations.
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页码:489 / 507
页数:19
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