Can Reminders and Incentives Improve Implementation Within Government? Evidence from a Field Experiment

被引:3
|
作者
Andersen, Simon Calmar [1 ]
Hvidman, Ulrik [1 ]
机构
[1] Aarhus Univ, Aarhus, Denmark
关键词
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; COGNITIVE BIASES; PERFORMANCE; POLICY;
D O I
10.1093/jopart/muaa022
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Existing research demonstrates how governments can use insights from behavioral science to design policy and alter residents' behavior. This article proposes that the effect of behavioral interventions may be different in hierarchical organizations where the decision to change behavior and the execution of that decision are split between different individuals. We examine the effect of two small-scale interventions-personal reminders and financial incentives-in a large-scale field experiment with public schools in Denmark.The Ministry of Education invited a representative sample of public schools to adopt a program that provides information on students' socio-emotional competencies. Results show that small financial incentives increased managers' adoption of the program by 7 percentage points. Frontline workers' subsequent data generation and performance information acquisition were also increased in the incentive treatment groups, even though the latter was not incentivized. Reminders paired with incentives had an impact on the managers' adoption, but the reminder effect disappeared during the implementation phase. These findings demonstrate both the potentials and limitations of applying behavioral research on individual residents to hierarchical organizations.
引用
收藏
页码:234 / 249
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] How monetary incentives improve outcomes in MOOCs: Evidence from a field experiment
    Gong, Jie
    Liu, Tracy Xiao
    Tang, Jie
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2021, 190 : 905 - 921
  • [2] Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians
    Kingsada, Aimee
    [J]. SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE, 2024, 352
  • [3] The Structure of Health Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment
    Carrera, Mariana
    Royer, Heather
    Stehr, Mark
    Sydnor, Justin
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2020, 66 (05) : 1890 - 1908
  • [4] Blood donations and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment
    Goette, Lorenz
    Stutzer, Alois
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2020, 170 : 52 - 74
  • [5] Can Mobile Phones Improve Learning? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Niger
    Aker, Jenny C.
    Ksoll, Christopher
    Lybbert, Travis J.
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2012, 4 (04) : 94 - 120
  • [6] Can incentives improve survey data quality in developing countries?: results from a field experiment in India
    Stecklov, Guy
    Weinreb, Alexander
    Carletto, Calogero
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY SERIES A-STATISTICS IN SOCIETY, 2018, 181 (04) : 1033 - 1056
  • [7] Individual incentives and workers' contracts: evidence from a field experiment
    Choudhary, M. Ali
    Gabriel, Vasco J.
    Rickman, Neil
    [J]. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 2021, 73 (01): : 248 - 272
  • [8] Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment
    Leuven, Edwin
    Oosterbeek, Hessel
    Sonnemans, Joep
    van der Klaauw, Bas
    [J]. JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 2011, 29 (03) : 637 - 658
  • [9] Sorting, incentives and risk preferences: Evidence from a field experiment
    Bellemare, Charles
    Shearer, Bruce
    [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2010, 108 (03) : 345 - 348
  • [10] The response to incentives and contractual efficiency: Evidence from a field experiment
    Paarsch, Harry J.
    Shearer, Bruce S.
    [J]. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2009, 53 (05) : 481 - 494