GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF HOLD-UP PROBLEM AND NON-EXCLUSIVE FRANCHISE CONTRACT

被引：1

作者：

Chu, Chih-Ning ^{[1
]}

Liu, Wai-Man ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Chung Yuan Christian Univ, Coll Management, Dept Business Adm, Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Australian Natl Univ, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

来源：

PACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2010年 / 15卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0106.2010.00523.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model that examines the emergence of non-exclusive franchise contracts in the presence of the franchisor hold-up problem. Our model of an endogenous franchising network underscores the trade-off between the cost associated with specifying and enforcing the contractual terms and the cost associated with broadening the relationships with multiple franchisors. We show that when the contracting cost relative to the relational cost is high and when the economies of specialization is low, a non-exclusive franchise contract is an optimal contractual arrangement to mitigate franchisor opportunism.

引用

页码：674 / 684

页数：11

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