Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem

被引：3

作者：

Carrasco, Vinicius ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PUC Rio, Dept Econ, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 03期

关键词：

Regulation; Common agency; Relationship-specific investments; INTEGRATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper shows that, in comparison to a single-regulator arrangement, when an agent reports to two regulators, he is confronted with more powerful ex-post incentives. This generates, from an ex-ante perspective, higher incentives for relationship-specific investment. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：264 / 268

页数：5

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