Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem

被引:3
|
作者
Carrasco, Vinicius [1 ]
机构
[1] PUC Rio, Dept Econ, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
关键词
Regulation; Common agency; Relationship-specific investments; INTEGRATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that, in comparison to a single-regulator arrangement, when an agent reports to two regulators, he is confronted with more powerful ex-post incentives. This generates, from an ex-ante perspective, higher incentives for relationship-specific investment. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:264 / 268
页数:5
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