Electromagnetic Side Channel Information Leakage Created by Execution of Series of Instructions in a Computer Processor

被引:16
|
作者
Yilmaz, Baki Berkay [1 ]
Prvulovic, Milos [2 ]
Zajic, Alenka [1 ]
机构
[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Elect & Comp Engn, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
[2] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Comp Sci, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
关键词
Electromagnetic emanation security; electromagnetic information leakage; information security; security of modern processors; TEMPEST; side-channel attack; covert-channel attack; channel capacity; DIFFERENTIAL POWER; DELETIONS; ATTACKS; CAPACITY; INSERTIONS; RATES;
D O I
10.1109/TIFS.2019.2929018
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
The side-channel leakage is a consequence of program execution in a computer processor, and understanding relationship between code execution and information leakage is a necessary step in estimating information leakage and its capacity limits. This paper proposes a methodology to relate program execution to electromagnetic side-channel emanations and estimates side-channel information capacity created by execution of series of instructions (e.g., a function, a procedure, or a program) in a processor. To model dependence among program instructions in a code, we propose to use Markov source model, which includes the dependencies among sequence of instructions as well as dependencies among instructions as they pass through a pipeline of the processor. The emitted electromagnetic (EM) signals during instruction executions are natural choice for the inputs into the model. To obtain the channel inputs for the proposed model, we derive a mathematical relationship between the emanated instruction signal power (ESP) and total emanated signal power while running a program. Then, we derive the leakage capacity of EM side channels created by execution of series of instructions in a processor. Finally, we provide experimental results to demonstrate that leakages could be severe and that a dedicated attacker could obtain important information.
引用
收藏
页码:776 / 789
页数:14
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