Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model

被引：1

作者：

Wu, Zhong-bing ^{[1
]}

Yao, Bing ^{[2
]}

Liu, Yi-sheng ^{[1
]}

Jiang, Shijie ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Ministry Construct, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] Chongqing Univ Sci & Technol, Chongqing, Peoples R China

来源：

ADVANCED BUILDING MATERIALS, PTS 1-4 | 2011年 / 250-253卷 / 1-4期

关键词：

Agent-construction; Multitask principal agent; Incentive equilibrium mechanism;

D O I：

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440

中图分类号：

TU [建筑科学];

学科分类号：

0813 ;

摘要：

Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.

引用

页码：2440 / +

页数：2

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