Reverse Logistics Outsourcing Mechanism Research Based on Principal-Agent Theory

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang Haiyan [1 ]
Tu Min [1 ]
机构：
[1] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Transportat, Wuhan 430063, Peoples R China
来源：
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT, VOLS I AND II | 2010年
关键词：
Reverse logistics outsourcing; Reputation effects; Ratchet effects; Relative performance contrast;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Operating reverse logistics in enterprise better or not is directly, related to customers' satisfaction and loyalty. Therefore, many enterprises usually adopt a policy to outsource their reverse logistics in order to strengthen their competence in the market. How to design an incentive mechanism is a key problem in reverse logistics outsourcing management. Through the reputation effects model pursued by the agent and the ratchet effects model caused by the principal increasing the standard, the reverse logistics outsourcing mechanism is analyzed, and a relative performance contrast is put forward to weaken the ratchet effects to design the incentive mechanism which can get two-win between the principal and the agent.
引用
收藏
页码：390 / 393
页数：4
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