Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model

被引：1

作者：

Wu, Zhong-bing ^{[1
]}

Yao, Bing ^{[2
]}

Liu, Yi-sheng ^{[1
]}

Jiang, Shijie ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Ministry Construct, Beijing, Peoples R China

[3] Chongqing Univ Sci & Technol, Chongqing, Peoples R China

来源：

ADVANCED BUILDING MATERIALS, PTS 1-4 | 2011年 / 250-253卷 / 1-4期

关键词：

Agent-construction; Multitask principal agent; Incentive equilibrium mechanism;

D O I：

10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440

中图分类号：

TU [建筑科学];

学科分类号：

0813 ;

摘要：

Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.

引用

页码：2440 / +

页数：2

共 50 条

[21] Incentive Mechanism Design for Employee Knowledge Sharing Based on Principal-agent Theory
Bin, Fan
[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2010 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LOGISTICS SYSTEMS AND INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-3, 2010, : 319 - 323
[22] Construction process cost game based on principal-agent model
Wang X.-M.
Xiong J.-J.
Su Q.-L.
[J]. Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision, 2019, 34 (02): : 390 - 394
[23] Research on Incentive Mechanise of Engineering Insurance Technical Service Based on Principal-Agent
Zhu Jian-bo
Shi Qian-qian
Sheng Zhao-han
Tao Sha
[J]. 2016 23RD ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, VOLS. I AND II, 2016, : 1436 - 1443
[24] Research on the Principal-Agent Game of Multi-incentive Mechanism for DB Subcontract in CSPC
Li Ning
Wang Yaowu
Yao Bing
[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRUCTION & REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1 AND 2, 2009, : 434 - 438
[25] The Research of the Incentive Wage Supervision of Commercial Banks Based on the Principal-Agent Theory
Wang, Jinhong
[J]. 2013 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 2013, : 216 - 221
[26] Principal-agent model based on the principal and agent's asymmetric overconfidence
Business School, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
[J]. Xitong Gongcheng Lilum yu Shijian, 2009, 4 (92-102):
[27] Mechanism of generation rights trades based on principal-agent model
Huazhong Univ. of Sci. and Technol., Wuhan 430074, China
[J]. Dianli Xitong Zidonghue, 2008, 2 (30-34):
[28] Model of Supply Chain Partnership based on principal-agent mechanism
Sun, Yongjun
Pan, Xiaohong
Cheng, Yaodong
Zhong, Zhigang
Qi, Fangzhong
[J]. Gaojishu Tongxin/High Technology Letters, 2002, 12 (10):
[29] Incentive Mechanism for University Teachers under Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Lu Fang
Zhang Jiangshun
Luo Ding-ti
[J]. 2014 SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCES AND OPTIMIZATION (CSO), 2014, : 74 - 78
[30] Study on the principal-agent model in the imperial examination system based on the incentive theory
Peng Kai
Wang Xianjia
[J]. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Innovation & Management, Vols 1 and 2, 2006, : 1495 - 1497

← 1 2 3 4 5 →