Research on Incentive Mechanise of Engineering Insurance Technical Service Based on Principal-Agent

In risk management of mega projects, in order to avoid the moral hazard of the construction part y during the engineering construction, the insurance organization undertaking the insurance policy often employs the supervisor organization to conduct supervision on the whole process and the engineering quality. On this basis, this article constructs the multitask principal-agent incentive model of the insurance organization to the supervision task, and discusses on the influence of the characteristics of the supervisor organization on the whole incentive effect, and gives the optimal incentive strategy of the insurance organization and the analysis of examples. According to the research results, the design of the incentive mechanism of multitask principal-agent reduces the information asymmetry between both parties. It promotes the supervisor organization to allocate resources on cost and service quality in a reasonable way, and realizes the coordination and Balance of control objectives, to improve the earning positions of both parties and achieve win-win.