The core of a further m-sided assignment game

被引：4
|
作者：
Marchi, E [1 ]
Oviedo, JA [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV NACL SAN LUIS,INST MATEMAT APLICADA SAN LUIS,RA-5700 SAN LUIS,ARGENTINA
来源：
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 1997年 / 98卷 / 03期
关键词：
game theory; linear programming; assignment game; cooperative game theory;
D O I：
10.1016/S0377-2217(96)00176-2
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
A further generalization of the Shapley-Shubik housing market is considered in which there are m types of individuals instead of two. This is different from the generalization of Quint. These games can have empty cares. (C) Elsevier Science B.V.
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页码：617 / 625
页数：9
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