The nucleolus and the core-center of multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets

被引:4
|
作者
Tejada, Oriol [1 ,2 ]
Nunez, Marina [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Barcelona, Dept Actuarial Financial & Econ Math, Barcelona 08034, Spain
[2] ETH, Ctr Econ Res, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Multi-sided assignment games; Core; Nucleolus; Core-center; GAME; KERNEL;
D O I
10.1007/s00186-012-0381-x
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m sectors. What is more, in the calculus of the nucleolus of this latter game only singletons and coalitions containing all agents but one need to be taken into account. All these results simplify the computation of the nucleolus and the core-center of a multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment market with a large number of agents. As a consequence we can show that, contrary to the bilateral case, for multi-sided Bohm-Bawerk assignment markets the nucleolus and the core-center do not coincide in general.
引用
收藏
页码:199 / 220
页数:22
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