Strategy Design of Multiple Statistical MIMO Radar Network and Jammer Based on Stackelberg Game

被引:1
|
作者
Zhang, Gangsheng [1 ]
Xie, Junwei [1 ]
Liu, Xiangyang [2 ]
Zhang, Haowei [1 ]
Liu, Mingjie [1 ]
机构
[1] Air Force Engn Univ, Air & Missile Def Coll, Xian 710051, Peoples R China
[2] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Elect Informat, Xian 710072, Peoples R China
关键词
MIMO radar; Jamming; Radar; Games; Resource management; Receivers; Vectors; Jammer; mutual information (MI); Stackelberg game; statistical MIMO radar network; strategy design; WAVE-FORM DESIGN; INFORMATION; SUPPRESSION; ALLOCATION;
D O I
10.1109/JSEN.2024.3415375
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This article investigates the strategy design problem between a multiple statistical MIMO radar network and a jammer, whose primary objective is to minimize their transmission power while satisfying a certain standard. Their conflict relationship is depicted as a two-person zero-sum (TPZS) game due to their adversarial nature. Mutual information (MI) is employed as the utility function where the multiple statistical MIMO radar network and the jammer can change their power allocation strategy to satisfy MI standards for the two players separately. The Stackelberg game is used to study and generate the equilibrium solutions for the strategy design between the multiple statistical MIMO radar network and the jammer. Finally, the simulation results show that, compared with other algorithms, the proposed method can save the leader's total power under a certain MI standard and has less algorithm complexity.
引用
收藏
页码:24328 / 24336
页数:9
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