Stackelberg game and greedy strategy based optimal dispatch of active distribution network with electric vehicles

With increasing penetrations of electric vehicles, both the grid-side impact and cost of disorderly charging and discharging should be taken into account, which contributes to achieving a win-win situation between the power grid and electric vehicle owners. Hence, a Stackelberg game model between the active distribution network and electric vehicle owners is established. The upper layer aims at minimizing the operating cost of the distribution network, and guides the charging and discharging of electric vehicles through reasonable electricity price and incentive strategy. At the same time, the dispatch of distributed generators and energy storages are coordinated. The lower layer performs a two-stage dispatch based on greedy strategy. Firstly, the charging and discharging strategy is optimized with the goal of minimizing cost under the time-of-use electricity price. Then, without reducing the revenue, the strategy is adjusted to maximize the grid's incentive revenue for reducing load fluctuations. Numerical results of a modified IEEE 33-bus system indicate that the proposed model greatly reduces the peak-to-valley difference while maximizing the revenue of both parties. In addition, the new demand peaks caused by charging of a large number of electric vehicles are avoided. © 2020, Electric Power Automation Equipment Press. All right reserved.