MORAL HAZARD AND LIMITED-LIABILITY - IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

被引：27

|

作者：

BRANDER, JA

SPENCER, BJ

机构：

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1989年 / 30卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2526754

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：833 / 849

页数：17

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