Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining

被引：27
|
作者：
Pitchford, R [1 ]
机构：
[1] Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Social Sci, Ctr Econ Policy Res, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1998年 / 61卷 / 02期
关键词：
moral hazard; limited liability; bargaining;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00141-4
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I examine the standard assumption in the moral hazard agency literature that the principal has all the bargaining power at the contract offer stage. When the agent has limited liability, as is often the case in practice, the contract changes according to the distribution of bargaining power, and consequently so does the agents effort. Implications of this result are examined. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：251 / 259
页数：9
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