On the Authority of Aristotle's Poetics

Aristotle's Poetics has a special prestige. Its statements are rarely rejected, but usually reinterpreted to harmonize with recent views. It is, however, not at all insignificant how just or justifiable the strategies are one uses in one's argumentation. After discussing shortly Frye's concepts of dianoia, melos, and opsis as an example rather easy to catch of manipulating with Aristotle's authority, I will analyse Ricoeur's comments on metaphor and Genette's critique of the theory of literary genres. Both of them base their criticism of rival theories on the criticism of their reading of Aristotle, as if disproving the reading meant also disproving the theory behind it by showing that the theory has no continuous existence from the very beginning. They do not, however, simply refute the argument of authority, but attempt to take over the supreme authority. Ricoeur operates with the implications against Aristotle's explicit definitions, which seems to be a strange method of analysis, especially when its aim is not the critique of the conception, but its apology. Genette's method is based on the argumentatio e silentio. Elements of the explicit definitions which play no role in the following analysis he regards as being retrospectively excluded from the conception. It is hard to admit that argumentatio e silentio, which is a dubious argumentative method in general, can be applied to the modification of an inclusive system based on rigorous logical principles.