Optimal equilibrium bidding strategies for budget constrained bidders in sponsored search auctions

被引:0
|
作者
Nittala Chaitanya
Yadati Narahari
机构
[1] Indian Institute of Science,Department of Computer Science and Automation
来源
Operational Research | 2012年 / 12卷
关键词
Optimal bidding strategies; Sponsored search auctions; Locally envy-free equilibrium; Budgeted bidders;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Budget optimization (selecting an optimal set of keywords to bid for, given a limited amount of budget) and bid optimization (determining optimal bids for the selected keywords) in the face of an unpredictable keyword traffic is a challenging problem facing advertisers in sponsored search auctions. Another key requirement in sponsored search auctions is stability of the bid profile, which is usually characterized through the notion of locally envy-free equilibrium. A variety of budget optimization and bid optimization ideas have been proposed in the literature; the bid profiles suggested by them have varying stability properties. In this paper, our objective is to come up with a bidding strategy for advertisers that is optimal for the budget optimization as well as the bid optimization problems and also guarantees convergence to a locally envy-free equilibrium. Our approach works with a linear program for the budget optimization problem whose optimal solution is a greedy strategy, which we call the OPT strategy. The OPT strategy yields a bid profile that maximizes the return on investment for the advertisers and ensures convergence of the bid profiles to a locally envy-free equilibrium in the asynchronous case as well as in a restricted synchronous case. We also suggest an improved strategy called the MAX strategy which produces equal or higher advertiser utilities compared to the OPT strategy while enjoying identical equilibrium convergence properties as OPT.
引用
收藏
页码:317 / 343
页数:26
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [11] Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders
    Koh, Youngwoo
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2013, 17 (04) : 307 - 321
  • [12] Optimal Bidding in Multi-Item Multislot Sponsored Search Auctions
    Abhishek, Vibhanshu
    Hosanagar, Kartik
    OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2013, 61 (04) : 855 - 873
  • [13] Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
    Benoît, JP
    Krishna, V
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2001, 68 (01): : 155 - 179
  • [14] Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
    Edelman, Benjamin
    Schwarz, Michael
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2010, 100 (02): : 597 - 602
  • [15] Correcting vindictive bidding behaviors in sponsored search auctions
    Chen-Kun Tsung
    Hann-Jang Ho
    Sing-Ling Lee
    The Journal of Supercomputing, 2014, 69 : 1166 - 1182
  • [16] Correcting vindictive bidding behaviors in sponsored search auctions
    Tsung, Chen-Kun
    Ho, Hann-Jang
    Lee, Sing-Ling
    JOURNAL OF SUPERCOMPUTING, 2014, 69 (03): : 1166 - 1182
  • [17] Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
    Tian-Ming Bu
    Xiaotie Deng
    Qi Qi
    Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2012, 23 : 356 - 372
  • [18] Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions
    Tsung, Chen-Kun
    Ho, Hann-Jang
    Lee, Sing-Ling
    MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING, 2013, 2013
  • [19] Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders
    Fatima, Shaheen S.
    Wooldridge, Michael
    Jennings, Nicholas R.
    MULTIAGENT AND GRID SYSTEMS, 2010, 6 (5-6) : 403 - 414
  • [20] A dynamic model of bidding patterns in sponsored search auctions
    Asdemir, Kursad
    INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & MANAGEMENT, 2011, 12 (01): : 1 - 16