Airport Privatization and International Competition

被引:0
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作者
Toshihiro Matsumura
Noriaki Matsushima
机构
[1] The University of Tokyo,
[2] Osaka University,undefined
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L33; L13; R48;
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摘要
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.
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页码:431 / 450
页数:19
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