A defender-attacker-defender approach to the optimal fortification of a rail intermodal terminal network

被引：15

作者：

Sarhadi H. ^{[1
]}

Tulett D.M. ^{[1
]}

Verma M. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Memorial University, St John’s

[2] DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Hamilton

来源：

Journal of Transportation Security | 2015年 / 8卷 / 1-2期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

Fortification; Heuristic; Intentional attacks; Intermodal transportation; Leader-follower; Mixed-integer programming;

D O I：

10.1007/s12198-014-0152-4

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A crucial issue in modern supply chains is to guarantee continuity and efficiency in the event of natural and man-made threats. This task is challenging, especially given the finite resources and the complexity of the transportation infrastructure. We make use of a defender-attacker-defender framework to determine the optimal strategy for fortifying a given number of rail-truck intermodal terminals, such that the losses (or inefficiencies) resulting from an intentional attack is minimized. The proposed tri-level optimization model, used to study a realistic size case study from published literature, is solved using three distinct solution techniques. Finally, we present some managerial insights and directions of future research. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.

引用

页码：17 / 32

页数：15