A defender-attacker-defender approach to the optimal fortification of a rail intermodal terminal network

被引:15
|
作者
Sarhadi H. [1 ]
Tulett D.M. [1 ]
Verma M. [2 ]
机构
[1] Memorial University, St John’s
[2] DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Hamilton
基金
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
Fortification; Heuristic; Intentional attacks; Intermodal transportation; Leader-follower; Mixed-integer programming;
D O I
10.1007/s12198-014-0152-4
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
A crucial issue in modern supply chains is to guarantee continuity and efficiency in the event of natural and man-made threats. This task is challenging, especially given the finite resources and the complexity of the transportation infrastructure. We make use of a defender-attacker-defender framework to determine the optimal strategy for fortifying a given number of rail-truck intermodal terminals, such that the losses (or inefficiencies) resulting from an intentional attack is minimized. The proposed tri-level optimization model, used to study a realistic size case study from published literature, is solved using three distinct solution techniques. Finally, we present some managerial insights and directions of future research. © 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
引用
收藏
页码:17 / 32
页数:15
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