Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

被引：0
|
作者：
Antonio Romero-Medina
Matteo Triossi
机构：
[1] Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,Department of Economics
[2] Ca’ Foscari University of Venice,Department of Management
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2021年 / 50卷
关键词：
Many-to-many; Acyclicity; Stability; Strategy-proofness; C71; C78; D71;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
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页码：105 / 118
页数：13
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