Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

被引：0
|
作者：
Antonio Romero-Medina
Matteo Triossi
机构：
[1] Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,Department of Economics
[2] Ca’ Foscari University of Venice,Department of Management
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 2021年 / 50卷
关键词：
Many-to-many; Acyclicity; Stability; Strategy-proofness; C71; C78; D71;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
引用
收藏
页码：105 / 118
页数：13
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
    Ackermann, Heiner
    Goldberg, Paul W.
    Mirrokni, Vahab S.
    Roglin, Heiko
    Vocking, Berthold
    [J]. ACM SIGECOM EXCHANGES, 2009, 8 (01)
  • [22] Interviewing in two-sided matching markets
    Lee, Robin S.
    Schwarz, Michael
    [J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2017, 48 (03): : 835 - 855
  • [23] Principles of two-sided matching markets
    de Larquier, G
    [J]. REVUE ECONOMIQUE, 1997, 48 (06): : 1409 - 1438
  • [24] UNCOORDINATED TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS
    Ackermann, Heiner
    Goldberg, Paul W.
    Mirrokni, Vahab S.
    Roeglin, Heiko
    Voecking, Berthold
    [J]. SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 2011, 40 (01) : 92 - 106
  • [25] Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
    Ackermann, Heiner
    Goldberg, Paul W.
    Mirrokni, Vahab S.
    Roeglin, Heiko
    Voecking, Berthold
    [J]. EC'08: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 2008, : 256 - 263
  • [26] Many-to-Many Superpixel Matching for Robust Tracking
    Wang, Junqiu
    Yagi, Yasushi
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS, 2014, 44 (07) : 1237 - 1248
  • [27] Tractable Model of Dynamic Many-to-Many Matching
    Peski, Marcin
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 2022, 14 (02) : 1 - 43
  • [28] Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
    Cechlarova, Katarina
    Eirinakis, Pavlos
    Fleiner, Tamas
    Magos, Dimitrios
    Mourtos, Ioannis
    Potpinkova, Eva
    [J]. DISCRETE OPTIMIZATION, 2014, 14 : 160 - 169
  • [29] Many-to-Many Matching for Combinatorial Spectrum Trading
    Jiang, Linshan
    Cai, Haofan
    Chen, Yanjiao
    Zhang, Jin
    Li, Baochun
    [J]. 2016 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2016,
  • [30] Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
    Hatfield, John William
    Kominers, Scott Duke
    [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2017, 101 : 78 - 97
12345