Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions

被引:0
|
作者
Shantanu Biswas
Y. Narahari
机构
[1] Indian Institute of Science,Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Computer Science and Automation
关键词
combinatorial auctions; iterative auctions; generalized Vickrey auctions; weighted set packing problem; weighted set covering problem; incentive compatibility; efficiency; e-selling; e-procurement;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The combinatorial auction problem can be modeled as a weighted set packing problem. Similarly the reverse combinatorial auction can be modeled as a weighted set covering problem. We use the set packing and set covering formulations to suggest novel iterative Dutch auction algorithms for combinatorial auction problems. We use generalized Vickrey auctions (GVA) with reserve prices in each iteration. We prove the convergence of the algorithms and show that the solutions obtained using the algorithms lie within provable worst case bounds. We conduct numerical experiments to show that in general the solutions obtained using these algorithms are much better than the theoretical bounds.
引用
下载
收藏
页码:185 / 205
页数:20
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] EQUILIBRIA OF GREEDY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
    Lucier, Brendan
    Borodin, Allan
    SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 2017, 46 (02) : 620 - 660
  • [42] Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable
    Krysta, Piotr
    Ventre, Carmine
    ALGORITHMS-ESA 2010, PT II, 2010, 6347 : 39 - 50
  • [43] Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
    Holzman, R
    Kfir-Dahav, N
    Monderer, D
    Tennenholtz, M
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2004, 47 (01) : 104 - 123
  • [44] Robot exploration with combinatorial auctions
    Berhault, M
    Huang, H
    Keskinocak, P
    Koenig, S
    Elmaghraby, W
    Griffin, P
    Kleywegt, A
    IROS 2003: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 IEEE/RSJ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT ROBOTS AND SYSTEMS, VOLS 1-4, 2003, : 1957 - 1962
  • [45] Combinatorial advertising internet auctions
    Dimitri, Nicola
    ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH AND APPLICATIONS, 2018, 32 : 49 - 56
  • [46] Some tractable combinatorial auctions
    Tennenholtz, M
    SEVENTEENTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI-2001) / TWELFTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IAAI-2000), 2000, : 98 - 103
  • [47] Combinatorial Auctions Without Money
    Fotakis, Dimitris
    Krysta, Piotr
    Ventre, Carmine
    ALGORITHMICA, 2017, 77 (03) : 756 - 785
  • [48] Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions
    Lerner, Anat
    Gonen, Rica
    INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2016, 18 (03)
  • [49] Combinatorial Reverse Electricity Auctions
    Shil, Shubhashis Kumar
    Sadaoui, Samira
    ADVANCES IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, CANADIAN AI 2017, 2017, 10233 : 162 - 168
  • [50] Design issues for combinatorial auctions
    Abrache J.
    Crainic T.G.
    Gendreau M.
    Quarterly Journal of the Belgian, French and Italian Operations Research Societies, 2004, 2 (1) : 1 - 33