combinatorial auctions;
iterative auctions;
generalized Vickrey auctions;
weighted set packing problem;
weighted set covering problem;
incentive compatibility;
efficiency;
e-selling;
e-procurement;
D O I:
暂无
中图分类号:
学科分类号:
摘要:
The combinatorial auction problem can be modeled as a weighted set packing problem. Similarly the reverse combinatorial auction can be modeled as a weighted set covering problem. We use the set packing and set covering formulations to suggest novel iterative Dutch auction algorithms for combinatorial auction problems. We use generalized Vickrey auctions (GVA) with reserve prices in each iteration. We prove the convergence of the algorithms and show that the solutions obtained using the algorithms lie within provable worst case bounds. We conduct numerical experiments to show that in general the solutions obtained using these algorithms are much better than the theoretical bounds.
机构:
Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
Univ Maryland, Syst Res Inst, College Pk, MD 20742 USAUniv Connecticut, Sch Business, Storrs, CT 06269 USA