In offense of usury laws: Microfoundations of illegal credit contracts

Several European countries base their anti-usury laws on the definition of interest ceilings. Underlying this approach is the identification of high interest rates with the usurious nature of the relative credit contract; hence usury is nothing more than a particularly onerous credit contract. The present paper contradicts this traditional view by presenting a general micro-founded model of credit contracts that arrives at a few conclusions, before in a static and then in a dynamic contest. Firstly, it demonstrates the specificity of the usury contract with respect to the bank contract, pointing up the particular nature of those who supply and demand usurious credit. Secondly, it demonstrates that in environmental situations with little protection of property rights and a propensity to illegality, the decision of a borrower to turn to a usurer may be efficient from the Pareto standpoint and thus not the result of a rationing equilibrium in the bank credit market, as is commonly thought. Thirdly, it deduces from this the insubstantial link between "interest rate level and the usurious nature of the contract." Hence two consequences for policy: (a) it is more effective to combat usury by improving the laws and law enforcement to better protect property rights, rather than introduce rate ceilings; and (b) in any case, the usury market can be reduced but not eliminated, since it is a meeting place for particular borrowers and lenders of funds. © 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers.