Trade Credit Contracts

被引:223
|
作者
Klapper, Leora [4 ]
Laeven, Luc [1 ]
Rajan, Raghuram [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] World Bank, Washington, DC USA
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2012年 / 25卷 / 03期
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
G32; COMPETITION; MANAGEMENT;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhr122
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We employ a novel data set on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics of the parties that contract together and the key terms of these contracts. Whereas prior work has typically used information on only one side of the buyer-seller transaction, we utilize information on both, allowing for the first analysis of buyer-seller pairs. An equally important distinction is that we have multiple contracts for the same buyer or supplier firms, rather than a firm-average response, allowing for the correction of time-invariant firm characteristics that might determine the choice of credit terms. We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from smaller suppliers, and that discounts for early payment tend to be offered to riskier buyers.
引用
收藏
页码:838 / 867
页数:30
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