Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain

被引：0

作者：

Zvi Safra

Einat Weissengrin

机构：

[1] Faculty of Management,

[2] Tel Aviv University,undefined

[3] Tel Aviv 69978,undefined

[4] Israel (e-mail: safraz@post.tau.ac.il; itai_w@netvision.net.il),undefined

来源：

Social Choice and Welfare | 2003年 / 20卷

关键词：

Large Domain; Restricted Domain; Impartial Observer; Social Lottery; Impartial Observer Theorem;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

In this paper we extend Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem by showing that the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted – it is sufficient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.

引用

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页码：177 / 187

页数：10

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