Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain

被引：0
|
作者：
Zvi Safra
Einat Weissengrin
机构：
[1] Faculty of Management,
[2] Tel Aviv University,undefined
[3] Tel Aviv 69978,undefined
[4] Israel (e-mail: safraz@post.tau.ac.il; itai_w@netvision.net.il),undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2003年 / 20卷
关键词：
Large Domain; Restricted Domain; Impartial Observer; Social Lottery; Impartial Observer Theorem;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this paper we extend Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem by showing that the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted – it is sufficient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.
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页码：177 / 187
页数：10
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