Models for the organization of state inspections and the struggle against corruption

被引：1
|
作者：
Vasin A.A. [1 ]
Kartunova P.A. [1 ]
Urazov A.S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Moscow State University, Moscow
来源：
Mathematical Models and Computer Simulations | 2010年 / 2卷 / 6期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
corruption; optimal organization; state inspections;
D O I：
10.1134/S2070048210060116
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A number of problems of the optimal organization for revenue collection and law enforcement inspections are considered: the selection of agents for the primary and repeated audit, the salaries and rewards of inspectors at different levels, and the total number of levels in the hierarchy. In each case, the optimal strategy for the organization of an inspection is determined depending on the parameters used. © 2010, Pleiades Publishing, Ltd.
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页码：760 / 775
页数：15
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