Towards a unified conception of the test of reality

The post-Freudian authors who have closely studied the problem of the test of reality have often claimed that Freud's three successive formulations (the capacity to distinguish perception from representation; the capacity to distinguish an "inside" from an "outside" via motor action and finally the judgment of existence) were irreconcilable. It has always therefore been thought necessary to choose between one or other of the three formulations. The Project is generally only cited supported by superiority of a definition of the test of reality which is founded on the capacity to distinguish the perceived from the represented. This has, however, not hindered the blossoming of numerous other definitions and a great number of various phenomena have been placed under the heading of test of reality. The authors of the present article, with reference to the Project, and notably via the often misunderstood notion of motor image, reveal the profound unity of the three Freudian versions of the test of reality. This unity is retraced on the basis of a distinction proposed by Freud but never subsequently developed, between "test of reality" and "test of the present".