Is collective financing feasible for small and micro-sized enterprises? An evolutionary game analysis of the credit market in China

With regards to the evolutionary game model of collective financing between commercial banks and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the self-guarantee mechanism formed within the enterprise group is taken as the research background in the paper. Under the circumstances of mortgage assets and unsecured assets, the changing trend of the strategies of both sides in the process of collective financing is made a discussion respectively. Followed by the evolutionary game, it is concluded that under the stable management strategy, commercial banks will offer different loan strategies (collective or separate) after comprehensively judging the repayment probability of enterprises. For SMEs, loans at a reasonable rate can prompt them to pay them back on time, however, high loan costs can lead to the possibility of total financing default and the adverse circumstances of risk diffusion. More importantly, collective financing of unsecured assets does not increase the bank?s credit risk, while not only can it help banks reduce the cost of loan review, but also alleviate the problem of information opacity in SMEs, prevent the occurrence of default risk and reduce the threshold for enterprises to obtain funds and also provide a new way to solve the financing problems of SMEs.