A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

被引：0

作者：

Karmokar, Madhuparna ^{[1
]}

Roy, Souvik ^{[1
]}

Storcken, Ton ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Indian Stat Inst, Econ Res Unit, Kolkata, India

[2] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 183卷

关键词：

Pareto optimality; Group strategy-proofness; Dictatorship; Inseparable top-pair;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108567

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider domains that satisfy pervasiveness and top-connectedness, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-dictatorial, Pareto optimal, and group strategy-proof choice rules on those domains. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页数：4

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