Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods

被引：0
|
作者：
James Schummer
机构：
[1] MEDS,
[2] Kellogg GSM,undefined
[3] Northwestern University,undefined
[4] Evanston,undefined
[5] IL 60208-2001,undefined
[6] USA (e-mail: schummer@nwu.edu),undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 1999年 / 13卷
关键词：
Keywords and Phrases: Strategyproof Public goods; Lotteries.; JEL Classification Numbers: C70; D70; H41.;
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学科分类号：
摘要：
It has long been known that when agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, there is an incompatibility between strategy-proofness and efficiency (Gibbard, [9]; Hylland, [12]) – a solution satisfying those properties must be dictatorial. We strengthen this result by showing that it follows from the same incompatibility on a series of much smaller domains of preferences.
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页码：709 / 722
页数：13
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