Road pricing for congestion control with unknown demand and cost functions

被引:70
|
作者
Yang, Hai [1 ]
Xu, Wei [2 ]
He, Bing-sheng [3 ]
Meng, Qiang [4 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Civil Engn, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ, Sch Management & Engn, Nanjing 210008, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Univ, Dept Math, Nanjing 210008, Peoples R China
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Civil Engn, Singapore 117548, Singapore
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Road pricing; Congestion control; Traffic equilibrium; Unknown demand; TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS; MONOTONE VARIATIONAL-INEQUALITIES; FLOW-DEPENDENT COSTS; NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM; IMPLEMENTATION; CONSTRAINTS; ALGORITHM; MODELS;
D O I
10.1016/j.trc.2009.05.009
中图分类号
U [交通运输];
学科分类号
08 ; 0823 ;
摘要
It is widely recognized that precise estimation of road tolls for various pricing schemes requires a few pieces of information such as origin-destination demand functions, link travel time functions and users' valuations of travel time savings, which are, however, not all readily available in practice. To circumvent this difficulty, we develop a convergent trial-and-error implementation method for a particular pricing scheme for effective congestion control when both the link travel time functions and demand functions are unknown. The congestion control problem of interest is also known as the traffic restraint and road pricing problem, which aims at finding a set of effective link toll patterns to reduce link flows to below a desirable target level. For the generalized traffic equilibrium problem formulated as variational inequalities, we propose an iterative two-stage approach with a self-adaptive step size to update the link toll pattern based on the observed link flows and given flow restraint levels. Link travel time and demand functions and users' value of time are not needed. The convergence of the iterative toll adjustment algorithm is established theoretically and demonstrated on a set of numerical examples. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:157 / 175
页数:19
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