population dynamics;
evolutionarily stable strategy;
equilibrium selection;
Stochastic stability;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.07.019
中图分类号:
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号:
07 ;
0710 ;
09 ;
摘要:
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机构:
Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Dana Farber Canc Inst, Boston, MA 02115 USA
Harvard TH Chan Sch Publ Hlth, Boston, MA 02115 USAHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Altrock, P. M.
Traulsen, A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Dept Evolutionary Theory, Plon, GermanyHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Traulsen, A.
Nowak, M. A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAHarvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA