Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players

被引：14
|
作者：
Miekisz, J [1 ]
机构：
[1] Warsaw Univ, Inst Appl Math & Mech, PL-02097 Warsaw, Poland
来源：
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY | 2005年 / 232卷 / 01期
关键词：
population dynamics; evolutionarily stable strategy; equilibrium selection; Stochastic stability;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.07.019
中图分类号：
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号：
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要：
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：47 / 53
页数：7
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