Integral Cryptanalysis on Full MISTY1

被引:33
|
作者
Todo, Yosuke [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] NTT Secure Platform Labs, Tokyo, Japan
[2] Kobe Univ, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan
关键词
MISTY1; Integral attack; Division property; ATTACK;
D O I
10.1007/s00145-016-9240-x
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It was well evaluated and standardized by projects, such as CRYPTREC, ISO/IEC, and NESSIE. In this paper, we propose a key recovery attack on the full MISTY1, i.e., we show that 8-round MISTY1 with 5 FL layers does not have 128-bit security. Many attacks against MISTY1 have been proposed, but there is no attack against the full MISTY1. Therefore, our attack is the first cryptanalysis against the full MISTY1. We construct a new integral characteristic by using the propagation characteristic of the division property, which was proposed in EUROCRYPT 2015. We first improve the division property by optimizing the division property for a public S-box and then construct a 6-round integral characteristic on MISTY1. Finally, we recover the secret key of the full MISTY1 with 2(63.58) chosen plaintexts and 2(121) time complexity. Moreover, if we use 2(63.994) chosen plaintexts, the time complexity for our attack is reduced to 2(108.3.) Note that our cryptanalysis is a theoretical attack. Therefore, the practical use of MISTY1 will not be affected by our attack.
引用
收藏
页码:920 / 959
页数:40
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