For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is 'strategically irrelevant', then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Univ Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, 2 Discovery Pl, Glasgow G11 6EY, ScotlandUniv Glasgow, Adam Smith Business Sch, 2 Discovery Pl, Glasgow G11 6EY, Scotland
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Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dept Comp & Syst Sci A Ruberti, I-00185 Rome, ItalyUniv Roma La Sapienza, Dept Comp & Syst Sci A Ruberti, I-00185 Rome, Italy
Facchinei, Francisco
Kanzow, Christian
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Univ Wurzburg, Inst Math, D-97074 Wurzburg, GermanyUniv Roma La Sapienza, Dept Comp & Syst Sci A Ruberti, I-00185 Rome, Italy
机构:I Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Univ, Lab Probabilist & Stat Methods, Tbilisi, Georgia
Glonti, O.
Harremoes, P.
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机构:I Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Univ, Lab Probabilist & Stat Methods, Tbilisi, Georgia
Harremoes, P.
Khechinashvili, Z.
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机构:I Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Univ, Lab Probabilist & Stat Methods, Tbilisi, Georgia
Khechinashvili, Z.
Topsoe, F.
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I Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Univ, Lab Probabilist & Stat Methods, Tbilisi, GeorgiaI Javakhishvili Tbilisi State Univ, Lab Probabilist & Stat Methods, Tbilisi, Georgia