An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept

被引:0
|
作者
Voorneveld, Mark [1 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Box 6501, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
Nash equilibrium; Axiomatization; Solution concept; GAMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is 'strategically irrelevant', then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:316 / 321
页数:6
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