Sequential contests

被引：54
|
作者：
Morgan, J [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2003年 / 116卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1023/A:1024252514806
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We compare expected rent-seeking expenditures and efficiency of simultaneous versus sequential rent-seeking contests. We find that when two risk neutral ex ante identical agents are competing, sequential contests are ex ante Pareto superior to simultaneous contests. We then endogenize the timing decision of rent-seeking expenditures and show that with ex ante identical contestants, all subgame perfect equilibria of this game are sequential contests.
引用
收藏
页码：1 / 18
页数：18
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