CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

被引：3

作者：

Megidish, Reut ^{[1
]}

Sela, Aner ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Sapir Acad Coll, IL-79165 Dn Hof Ashkelon, Israel

[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2014年 / 52卷 / 02期

关键词：

ALL-PAY AUCTION;

D O I：

10.1111/ecin.12031

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid. (JEL D44, D82, J31, J41)

引用

页码：608 / 617

页数：10

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