How delegation improves commitment

被引：10
|
作者：
Perino, Grischa [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 106卷 / 02期
关键词：
Time-inconsistency; Commitment; Delegation; CENTRAL-BANK INDEPENDENCE; MONETARY-POLICY; CREDIBILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.11.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
McCallum (1995, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (2), 207-211) conjectures that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it This holds if optimal ex-ante policies do not change if additional information becomes available However, with a flexibility-credibility trade-off delegation improves credibility (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved.
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页码：137 / 139
页数：3
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