How to Organize Pricing? Vertical Delegation and Horizontal Dispersion of Pricing Authority

被引:52
|
作者
Homburg, Christian [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Jensen, Ove [4 ]
Hahn, Alexander [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Mkt, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany
[2] Univ Mannheim, Inst Market Oriented Management, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany
[3] Univ Melbourne, Dept Management & Mkt, Melbourne, Vic 3010, Australia
[4] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
关键词
business-to-business marketing; pricing; pricing authority; sales management; sales force; SALESFORCE COMPENSATION; MARKET ORIENTATION; DECISION-MAKING; INFORMATION; STRATEGY; MANAGEMENT; FRAMEWORK; DESIGN; DETERMINANTS; ENVIRONMENTS;
D O I
10.1509/jm.11.0251
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Although pricing is one of the strongest drivers of profitability, little empirical research has examined how a firm should organize pricing internally. This research draws on the information-processing view of organizational design to conceptualize a framework of how firms organize their pricing authority both within the sales function and across the sales, marketing, and finance functions. The authors find a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between the vertical delegation of pricing authority and profitability as well as a positive relationship between the horizontal dispersion of pricing authority across sales, marketing, and finance and profitability. Another key finding is a positive interaction between vertical delegation and horizontal dispersion, indicating that firms need to jointly design vertical delegation and horizontal dispersion. In addition, the results identify price-related market dynamism as a moderator of the horizontal dispersion of the pricing authority-profitability relationship and emphasis on margin-based incentives as a moderator of vertical delegation of the pricing authority-profitability relationship. The authors also analyze the relationship between the organizational design of pricing authority and sales growth.
引用
收藏
页码:49 / 69
页数:21
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