Relating CEO Compensation to Social Performance and Financial Performance: Does the Measure of Compensation Matter?

被引:31
|
作者
Callan, Scott J. [1 ]
Thomas, Janet M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Bentley Univ, Waltham, MA 02452 USA
关键词
executive compensation; corporate financial performance (CFP); corporate social performance (CSP); corporate social responsibility (CSR); pay-for-performance; agency theory; stakeholder theory; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE; RESPONSIBILITY; FIRM; STAKEHOLDER; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; PAY;
D O I
10.1002/csr.1307
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Remuneration to executives has risen sharply, even during the recent economic decline and financial crisis, giving rise to public outcries and harsh criticism. At the same time, there has been a shift toward more performance-based remuneration, which is generally awarded over the long term. Coincident with these observations is an evolving literature aimed at studying executive pay and its determinants to learn if a pay-for-performance link exists. Although most studies focus on corporate financial performance (CFP) as a compensation determinant, which is based on shareholder theory, others broaden performance to include activities linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which relies on stakeholder theory. In this latter case, a nexus is identified between the pay-for-performance relationship and that between CFP and corporate social performance (CSP). In this research, we use a system of equations to form this connection and examine the influence of short-term versus long-term compensation measures on the resulting interrelationships. Copyright (C) 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment
引用
收藏
页码:202 / 227
页数:26
相关论文
共 50 条