A principal-agent analysis of fisheries

被引：16
|
作者：
Jensen, F [1 ]
Vestergaard, N [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ So Denmark, Dept Environm & Business Econ, DK-6700 Esbjerg, Denmark
来源：
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2002年 / 158卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1628/0932456022975376
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Very little principal-agent analysis has been done within the fisheries economic literature. This paper conducts a principal-agent analysis of fisheries. Within a standard principal-agent model, the low-cost agent must be allowed the same level of effort as under complete information. This conclusion does not hold for fisheries, because of a resource restriction and the fact that maximisation takes place over two variables. By means of comparative-static analysis. this paper argues that the low-cost agent must be allowed a larger effort than under complete information.
引用
收藏
页码：276 / 285
页数：10
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