Game Analysis on the Double Principal-Agent Risk in Risk Investment

被引:0
|
作者
Yang, Jinting [1 ]
Sun, Zilai [2 ]
Liu, Yinghui [2 ]
机构
[1] Handan Coll, Handan, Peoples R China
[2] Hebei Univ Engn, Coll Econ & Management, Handan, Peoples R China
关键词
Double Principal-agent risk; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Game analysis; Risk investment;
D O I
10.1109/KESE.2009.49
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In the risk investment system, whether the double principal-agent relationship which is formed by different interest subjects can smoothly operate is the key to determine the success of risk investment, yet the issue of information asymmetry in the field is more serious than other industry, so that double principal - agent relationship formed in it exists huge risks. A series of binding agreements and institutional arrangements can be reached among different interest subjects and strictly observed by all game parties, then this cooperative game can make the parties have sustained and stable income, and reached the win-win cooperation of game with incomplete information, so as to effectively restrain the double principal-agent risk.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / +
页数:2
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