Principal-Agent Model and Risk Analysis under Asymmetric Information Condition

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhang Guang-ming [1 ]
机构：
[1] Guangxi Univ Technol, Sch Management, Liuzhou 545006, Peoples R China
来源：
2011 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING - 18TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, VOLS I AND II | 2011年
关键词：
asymmetric information; principal; agent; risk;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
The paper describes a kind of principal-agent model under asymmetric information condition from actual economic life. Through the analysis on optimal solution of the model, we discover that the risk appetite of the agent has a direct effect on the optimal incentive mechanism and the risk sharing of principal and agent, and also endow a parameter in the incentive contract with new economic presentation.
引用
收藏
页码：187 / 191
页数：5
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