Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

被引:29
|
作者
Baujard, Antoinette [1 ]
Igersheim, Herrade [2 ,3 ]
Lebon, Isabelle [4 ,5 ]
Gavrel, Frederic [4 ,5 ]
Laslier, Jean-Francois [6 ]
机构
[1] Univ St Etienne, Univ Lyon, UMR CNRS 5824, GATE L SE, St Etiennne, France
[2] Univ Strasbourg, CNRS, Strasbourg, France
[3] Univ Strasbourg, UMR CNRS 7522, BETA, Strasbourg, France
[4] Univ Caen Basse Normandie, CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Caen, France
[5] Univ Caen Basse Normandie, Condorcet Ctr, Caen, France
[6] Paris Sch Econ, CNRS, UMR CNRS 8545, Paris, France
关键词
Voting; In situ experiment; Evaluative voting; Approval voting; Two-round system; FIELD EXPERIMENT; APPROVAL;
D O I
10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors "exclusive" candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor "inclusive" candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:131 / 145
页数:15
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